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CASENOTES

CRIMINAL LAW-Victim Impact Evidence-The Scope of
the Eighth Amendment Does Not Include a Per Se Bar to
the Use of Victim Impact Evidence in the
Sentencing Phase of a Capital Trial.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2597,
115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991).
In 1988, a Tennessee jury convicted Pervis Payne of two counts of firstdegree murder for the killings of Charisse Christopher and her young daughter Lacie.' In addition to the murder convictions, the jury found Payne
guilty of first-degree assault with intent to murder Charisse's son Nicholas.2
During the sentencing phase of Payne's capital trial, the State introduced the
testimony of Nicholas' grandmother.' In response to questions regarding
the impact the murders had on Nicholas' life, the grandmother told the sentencing jury that the child missed his mother and sister and cried often as a
result of their deaths.4 In closing arguments, the State also referred to
1. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. -, -, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2601, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 726
(1991). Payne, who had been drinking and injecting cocaine, entered the victims' apartment
after failing to locate his girlfriend who lived across the hall. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2601, 115
L. Ed. 2d at 726-27. The violence erupted when Charisse resisted Payne's sexual advances. Id.
at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2601, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 727. When police responded to a neighbor's telephone call, Payne was found to be covered in blood. Id. Inside the apartment the walls and
floor were also covered in blood. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2602, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 727. Charisse
was found to have a total of eighty-four wounds inflicted upon her from the thrusts of a
butcher knife. Lacie was also found with multiple stab wounds throughout her body. Id.
2. Id. at -., 111 S. Ct. at 2601, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 726. Nicholas survived the same type of
attack that killed his mother and sister despite having several knife wounds that pierced completely through his body. Id. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 2602, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 727.
3. Id. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 2603, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 728.
4. Id. The pertinent portion of the grandmother's testimony is as follows:
Q. Ms. Zvolanek, how has the murder of Nicholas' mother and his sister affected him?
A. He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come home.
And he cries for his sister Lacie. He come to me many times during the week and asks
me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says I'm worried bout
my Lacie.
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Nicholas' consciousness during the crime, and thus, his awareness of the
murders of his sister and mother.5 The jury sentenced Payne to death.6 On
appeal, Payne argued that the victim impact statements in the grandmother's testimony and in the State's closing argument violated the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. 7 The
Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the sentence holding the statements "relevant to his personal responsibility and moral guilt."' The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a sentencer should
be allowed to consider victim impact evidence when making a death penalty
determination. 9 Held-Affirmed.' ° The scope of the Eighth Amendment
does not include a per se bar to the use of victim impact evidence in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial."
The Eighth Amendment provides that "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."'12 In the capital punishment context, the United States Supreme

State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 17-18 (Tenn. 1990). This type of "victim impact" evidence has
previously been held to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment and therefore inadmissible
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509
(1987) (Eighth Amendment bars use of victim impact statements during penalty portion of
capital trial).
5. Payne, 501 U.S. at -,11 I S. Ct. at 2603, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 728-29. The prosecutor's
comments were as follows:
But we do know that Nicholas was alive. And Nicholas was in the same room. Nicholas
was still conscious. His eyes were open. He responded to the paramedics. He was able to
follow their directions. He was able to hold his intestines in as he was carried to the
ambulance. So he knew what happened to his mother and baby sister.
Id. Comments of this nature made by the prosecutor have also been held to be contrary to the
Eighth Amendment. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810-11 (1989) (holding in
Booth as to Eighth Amendment bar against victim impact statements also applies to comments
made by prosecutor during closing argument concerning victim's personal characteristics).
6. Id. at , 111 S. Ct. at 2603, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 729.
7. Id. at , 11 S. Ct. at 2604, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 729. The Supreme Court of Tennessee
rejected Payne's Eighth Amendment argument by holding that the grandmother's testimony
was "technically irrelevant," and found that the risk of arbitrariness was harmless and not
constitutionally unacceptable. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2604, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 730. Additionally, the court held that the prosecutor's comments were related to Payne's personal responsibility and therefore relevant. Id.
8. Id. at -, III S.Ct. at 2603, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 730.
9. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2604, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 730.
10. Id. at , 11 S.Ct. at 2611, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 739.
11. Id. at , 11 S.Ct. at 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 736.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 was the predecessor of
the ban on cruel and unusual punishments. See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 839 (1969). Virginia was the first state to adopt the provision from the English statute and did so in the
Virginia Constitution of 1776. Id. at 839-40. By 1791, the federal government followed the
lead of eight states and the Northwest Ordinance by enacting the "cruel and unusual punish-
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Court determined that the death penalty itself does not violate the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishments in all circumstances. 3 Due to the severe nature of the death penalty, however, the
Court required a minimized risk of arbitrariness in sentencing 4 and a degree
of proportionality to the offense prior to imposition of the death penalty. 5

ments" language as the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 840; see
also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-93 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.) (tracing history of Eighth Amendment to discredit imposition of mandatory sentencing statutes); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-72 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.) (reviewing history of Eighth Amendment); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666 (1962) (applying Eighth Amendment prohibitions to states through Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause); Dora Nevares-Muniz, The Eighth Amendment Revisited: A
Model of Weighted Punishments, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 272, 273 (1984) (tracing
history of cruel and unusual punishments prohibition).
13. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (statute which requires finding of aggravating factor while considering mitigating factors and provides for appellate review complies
with Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishments); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258-60 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (statute requiring aggravating circumstances to be weighed with mitigating ones and providing for appellate
review constitutional); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 165-69 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (statute requiring finding of at least one aggravating factor before
death penalty imposed and appellate review complies with Furman prohibitions). But see
Peggy C. Davis, The Death Penaltyand the CurrentState of the Law, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 7, 7-8
(1978) (suggesting that Eighth Amendment as articulated by Gregg gives little protection
against injustice); George E. Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO.
L.J. 97, 159 (1979) (suggesting that appellate review, although not useless, does not provide
meaningful safeguard against unjust infliction of death penalty).
14. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983) (difference in punishment of death
from other sanctions requires that its imposition by state not be arbitrary in its procedure);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)
(sentence of death may not be imposed by sentencing procedures that produce a significant risk
that it will be inflicted arbitrarily and capriciously); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-91
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (death penalty unique in its harsh and irreversible nature and
may not be arbitrarily inflicted); Lisa G. Bradley, Proportionalityin Capital and Non-Capital
Sentencing: An Eighth Amendment Enigma, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 195, 195 (1986-87) (Eighth
Amendment mandates regularity and reliability in imposing death penalty). But see RAOUL
BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 140 (1982) (objective of eliminating arbitrariness from death penalty determination may be impossible).
15. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (nexus

between punishment and defendant's blameworthiness required to satisfy Eighth Amendment's requirement of proportionality); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (although
death penalty extreme sanction, may not be disproportionate to some crimes); Weems v.

United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-82 (1910) (punishment of fifteen years hard labor for falsifying official document held disproportionate to offense committed). See generally Lisa G. Bradley, Proportionalityin Capital and Non-Capital Sentencing: An Eighth Amendment Enigma, 23
IDAHO L. REV. 195, 196-200 (1986-87) (reviewing history and application of proportionality
and suggesting that same proportionality standard be employed in both capital and non-capital
cases); Dora Nevares-Muniz, The Eighth Amendment Revisited: A Model of Weighted Punishments, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 272, 272 (1984) (proposing that present state sentenc-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 23 [2022], No. 2, Art. 8

ST. MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:517

In order to fulfill these objectives, the Supreme Court recognized the need
for a sentencer to exercise discretion in an informed manner.' 6 Therefore,
the Court placed certain guidelines on this discretion to ensure a responsible
and reliable decision. 7 For example, a sentencing authority must tailor its
death penalty determination to the individual defendant and the circumstances of the crime,'" and consider factors which relate only to the defendant's personal blameworthiness and moral guilt. 9

ing statutes fail proportionality requirement because penalty terms disregard severity of offense
and punishment).
16. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251-53 (1976) (Eighth Amendment's proscription against arbitrariness satisfied when sentencer's discretion guided by requirement that aggravating and mitigating factors be considered); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 60812 (5th Cir. 1978) (state can impose death penalty so long as complies with appropriate discretion guidelines); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 790-91 (Colo. 1990) (capital sentencing
scheme must limit and direct sentencer's discretion so as to minimize chance of arbitrariness
and allow sentencer to weigh mitigating factors to comply with Eighth Amendment). See
generally Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 886 (1990) (advocates of unrestricted discretion argue that it is necessary to review needs of offender and risks posed by individual);
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1942 (1988) (reviewing history of sentencing discretion and
problems associated with its expansion).
17. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982) (standards serving goals of consistency and fairness provided by Supreme Court to guide application of death penalty); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (sentencer must be allowed to consider mitigating
factors relating to defendant's character and circumstances of crime); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (higher degree of reliability needed in determination because
of difference between death and other punishments); see also James S. Liebman & Michael J.
Shepard, Guiding CapitalSentencing Discretion Beyond the 'Boiler Plate' Mental Disorderas a
MitigatingFactor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757, 771-73 (1978) (Court held in Gregg and companion cases
that state sentencing statutes must include mechanism where jury guided in its determination
of death penalty); Rupert V. Barry, Note, Furman to Gregg: The Judicialand Legislative
History, 22 How. L.J. 53, 86 (1979) (states responded to Furman by enacting sentencing
schemes which limited discretion of sentencers).
18. See Zant v. Stevens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983) (Georgia death penalty statute valid
since, inter alia, it provides for individualized determination of defendant's character); Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (death penalty reversed and case remanded for not
allowing for consideration of defendant's character and record in its imposition); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 (1978) (consideration of defendant's character and record makes
death penalty determination more reliable); see also Randy Hertz & Robert Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death:Lockett v. Ohio and the CapitalDefendant'sRight to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. REV. 317, 322 (1981) (U.S. Constitution
mandates individualized sentencing decision to obtain reliability); James S. Liebman &
Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the 'Boiler Plate': Mental
Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757, 772 (1978) (respect for humanity necessitates review of individualized information and circumstances of offense).
19. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (retribution requires that criminal
sentence be directly related to defendant's personal blameworthiness); California v. Brown,
479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (offender's background, character, and
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To assist the sentencing authority in reviewing the material relevant to a
death penalty determination, the Supreme Court has allowed the use of
presentence reports. 2 The report, which a probation officer normally
prepares, details the defendant's background, education, and prior criminal
record. 2' These presentence reports commonly include victim impact
evidence.2 2

offense should be basis for criminal sentence); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)
(death penalty reversed for lack of personal culpability and moral guilt where defendant did
not commit murder and had no such intention); Lisa G. Bradley, Proportionalityin Capital
and Non-CapitalSentencing: An Eighth Amendment Enigma, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 195, 207-08
(1986-87) (analysis of Enmund's focus on culpability of particular defendant); Arnold H.
Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness,and Harm: Balancingthe Factorson Which Our Criminal
Law is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REV. 283, 312-13 (1988) (mapping the course of culpability
requirement in capital punishment in light of Enmund, Tison, and Booth).
20. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 498-99 (1987) (allowing presentence report to
assist jury in making death penalty determination); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362
(1977) (holding that presentence report may be considered by judge, but lack of disclosure
amounts to denial of defendant's due process); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249-50
(1949) (sentencing judges should not be deprived of information available in presentence reports); see also Carol Shockley, The Federal Presentence Investigation Report: Postsentence
Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information Act, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 81 (1988)
(presentence reports assist sentencer in deciding appropriate penalty). See generally Keith A.
Findley & Meredith J. Ross, Comment, Access, Accuracy and Fairness: The Federal
Presentence Investigation Report Under Julian and the Sentencing Guidelines, 1989 Wis. L.
REV. 837, 839-40 (tracing history of presentence reports and problems with inaccuracies).
21. See United States Dept. of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988) (presentence report requires investigation of defendant's background and circumstances of crime); Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 498-99 (1987) (probation officer prepared presentence report describing defendant's criminal record, employment history, and education); Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 242-43 (1949) (presentence report complied with New York Criminal Code
which provided that report include defendant's criminal record, mental evaluation, and any
other information which may assist in proper sentencing determination); Keith A. Findley &
Meredith J. Ross, Comment, Access, Accuracy and Fairness: The FederalPresentenceInvestigation Report Under Julian and the Sentencing Guidelines, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 837, 840 (probation officer compiles presentence report to give sentencer complete picture of defendant); Amy
K. Posner, Comment, Victim Impact Statements and Restitution: Making the Punishment Fit
the Victim, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 301, 304-05 (1984) (although prior criminal record and general
behavior of defendant may be irrelevant at trial stage, these factors are necessary at sentencing
phase to give sentencers adequate information to determine penalty).
22. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 498-99 (1987) (victim impact statement included within presentence report in compliance with Maryland statute); State v. Huertas, 553
N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (Ohio 1990) (victim impact statement details victim's personal characteristics and emotional pain suffered by victim's family); Lodowski v. State, 490 A.2d 1228, 126364 (Md. 1985) (Cole, J., concurring) (victim impact statement included in presentence report
under Maryland law); Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1303, 130304 (1988) (victim impact statement relates effect crime has had on victim and family). See
generally Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the CriminalSentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 202-11 (1988) (describing information generally
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As a response to the growing concern that the criminal justice system
inequitably ignored victims, Congress passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (the act).2 3 One of the declared purposes of the act was "to
enhance and protect the necessary role of crime victims and witnesses in the
criminal justice process.", 24 The act amended the Federal Rules of Criminal

given by victim impact statements); Maureen McLeod, Victim Participationat Sentencing, 22
CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 505-11 (1986) (describing contents of victim impact statements, ways of

preparing them, and presentation formats).
23. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-15, (1988) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-80 (1982)). Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984) amended §§ 3579-80 and relocated them to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3663-64. The Victim and Witness Protection Act provides restitution for the victim, protection against retaliation and intimidation, a federal "Son of Sam" law which prohibits a felon
from profiting from the sale of his story, and a provision for the inclusion of victim impact
statements in a presentence report. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-15, 3663-64 (1988); see also United
States v. Wilson, 565 F. Supp. 1416, 1429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (witness and victim tampering
provision of Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 not unconstitutional on overbroadness
and violation of freedom of speech grounds); United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 135657 (1985) (retaliation provision of act withstands First Amendment attack since not applied to
idea or advocacy threats); United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 910-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1089 (1984) (ruling that appellant pay restitution to victim upheld despite Seventh
Amendment challenge); Susan A. Waddell, Recent Decision, The Constitutionality of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 35 ALA. L. REV. 529, 551 (1984) (proposing that
restitution provisions of the act should be able to withstand constitutional attacks); see also
Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 391, 393-95 (1989) (explanation of effects and purposes of Victim and Witness Protection
Act of 1982 and possible infringement on defendant's constitutional rights); John Heinz, The
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 29 PRAc. LAW. 13-8 (1983) (comprehensive overview of the Act by one of its drafters).
24. Victim and Witness Protection Act § 2(b)(1). The other two declared purposes
include:
(2) to ensure that the Federal Government does all that is possible within limits of available resources to assist victims and witnesses of crime without infringing on the constitutional rights of the defendant; and
(3) to provide a model for legislation for State and local governments.
Victim and Witness Protection Act §§ 2(b)(2) and 2(b)(3); see also United States v. King, 762
F.2d 232, 237 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1018 (1985) (tampering provision of Act only
intended to reach specific means such as intimidation, threat, or physical force); United States
v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 833-36 (11th Cir. 1984), on remand, 599 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ala.
1985) (purpose of restitution provision is to protect from defendant's threats and harassment,
increase victim involvement, and victim restoration to extent possible); United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 899 (2nd Cir. 1984) (Congress' intent of act was to prosecute witness
harassment and intimidation under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and no longer § 1503); Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 393-95
(1989) (discussion on effects of act on sentencing discretion); Lorraine Slavin & David J. Sorin,
Project, Congress Opens a Pandora'sBox-The Restitution Provisionsof the Victim and Witness
ProtectionAct of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 507 (1984) (act first governmental attempt
with intention of improving victim treatment); Martha Hoffman, Note, Victim Impact Statement, 10 W. ST. L. REV. 221, 222 (1983) (purpose of act to toughen existing protections for
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Procedure to require the inclusion of a victim impact statement as a section
of the presentence report submitted to the sentencing authority.25 Similar

legislation now exists in the majority of states and the District of Columbia
mandating the use of victim impact statements.2 6

victims and witnesses and require United States Attorney General to develop guidelines and
proposals toward this goal).
25. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 § 3, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248;
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D). As amended, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now
provide: "The report of the presentence investigation shall contain ... (D) verified information stated in a nonargumentative style containing an assessment of the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact upon, and cost to, any individual against whom the offense has
been committed." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D); see United States v. Santana, 908 F.2d 506,
507 (9th Cir. 1990) (judge's consideration of presentence victim impact information in noncapital case did not violate Booth holding against such consideration in capital cases); United
States v. Monaco, 852 F.2d 1143, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989)
(district judge did not err when he considered the victim impact letters included in presentence
report); United States v. Serhant, 740 F.2d 548, 551-53 (7th Cir. 1984) (judge's consideration
of victim impact statements not improper since information was noninflammatory and dignified concerning investors who lost money in defendant's mail fraud scheme); see also Dina R.
Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisanl, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391,
394 (1989) (discussion of revised Federal Rule 32(c)(2)(D)); Martha Hoffman, Note, Victim
Impact Statement, 10 W. ST. L. REV. 221, 222 (1983) (Rule 32 requires victim impact statement with presentence report).
26. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.022 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-253(4) (Supp.
1990), 13-702(D)(9) (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-109 (Supp. 1991); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1191.1 (Deering Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-102 (Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 54-91a (West Supp. 1990), 54-91c (Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4331 (Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-103a (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.143 (Supp.
1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.1 (Michie 1990); IDAHO CODE § 19-5306(b) (Supp. 1991);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-3-2(a) (Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-1-8 to 1-9
(Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 901.3(5) (Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4604(2)
(1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.520 (Supp. 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
875(B) (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1257 (West Supp. 1990); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 4B, ch. 258B, § 3(h) (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 611A.037-.038 (West Supp. 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-151 to 19-159 (Supp. 1990);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 217.762 (Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-112, 46-18-242 (1991);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2261 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176-145(3) (1989); N.H. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 651:4-a (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-6(b) (Supp. 1991); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 390.30(3) (Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.12, 2947.051 (Baldwin 1986);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 982 (West Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.530(2),
144.790(2) (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-9.3 (Purdon 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 1228-3, -4, -4.1 (Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550 (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-27-1.1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-207 (8), -209(b) (Supp. 1990);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 56.03 (Vernon 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7006 (Supp.
1990), tit. 28, § 204(e) (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299.1 (Michie 1990); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 7.69.020(4), .030 (West Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-1 1A-2, -3, -6 (1989);
WIS.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 950.04(2m),

.05(l)(dm)

(West

Supp. 1991);

WYo.

STAT.

§ 7-13-

303(a)(iv)-(v) (Supp. 1991); Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to
the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200 n.12 (1988); Richard L. Slowin-
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In 1987, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the use of victim
impact statements in a capital trial in Booth v. Maryland." In Booth, the
jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and robbery.28 In
spite of the defendant's objections, the court allowed the sentencing jury to
consider a presentence report compiled in accordance with Maryland law.2 9
The report included a victim impact statement based on interviews with the
victims' family.30 The jury sentenced Booth to death.3'
ski, Note, South Carolina v. Gathers: Prohibiting the Use of Victim-Related Information in
Capital Punishment Proceedings, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 215, 216 n.10 (1990).
27. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 497 (1987). Booth was a 5-4 decision. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Scalia joined. A separate dissent was filed by Justice Scalia in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and White joined. Id; see Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. _ -, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2626, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 757 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Booth marks first occasion for Court to rule on use of victim impact evidence); South Carolina
v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810 (1989) (Booth was first case to address whether victim impact
evidence violated principle that sentence must be related to defendant's culpability); see also
Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing
Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 220 (1988) (suggesting that although Booth was first capital
case to address use of victim impact statements, its narrow holding indicates that it would not
be last word). See generally Lester K. Syren, Note, Booth v. Maryland: Whether Victim Impact Statements Are Constitutional in Death Penalty Cases, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 171, 171-72 (1989) (discussing facts of Booth and indicating decision was unjust).
28. Booth, 482 U.S. at 497-98. John Booth, along with Willie Reid, robbed and murdered
Irvin Bronstein, seventy-eight, and his wife Rose, seventy-five, in an apparent attempt to steal
money for a heroin purchase. The defendant killed the Bronsteins because he was their neighbor, and he knew that they could identify him. Id. at 498. A kitchen knife was used to repeatedly stab them in the chest after they had been bound and gagged. Id. See generally Kevin J.
McCoy, Note, PreservingIntegrity in CapitalSentencing, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 333, 334-38
(1988) (citing facts of Booth).
29. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1990) (requiring a victim impact statement
to be included in presentence report). As a result of Booth, this section is invalid to the extent
that consideration of victim impact evidence violates the Eighth Amendment. Booth, 482 U.S.
at 509; see also State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (Ohio 1990) (jury allowed to consider
presentence report which included victim impact statements given by victim's parents);
Lodowski v. State, 490 A.2d 1228, 1263-64 (Md. 1985) (Cole, J., concurring) (victim impact
statement included in presentence report under Maryland law); Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV.
199, 202 (1988) (discussing differing statutes relating to victim impact statements among
states). See generally Maureen McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L.
BULL. 501, 504-07 (1986) (arguing for increased victim participation at trial through, inter
alia, use of victim impact statements).
30. Booth, 482 U.S. at 498-500. The report was prepared by the State Division of Parole
and Probation (DPP) in compliance with Maryland law. Id. at 498. In addition to the victim
impact statement, the report included a description of Booth's criminal history, education and
employment, and background. Id.
The victim interview of the son described how he experiences depression and sleeplessness,
feels like his parents were "butchered like animals," and is "fearful for the first time in his

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss2/8

8

Clements: The Scope of the Eighth Amendment Does Not Include a Per Se Bar t

1991]

CASENOTES

The United States Supreme Court ruled that allowing victim impact evidence in the sentencing portion of a capital trial violated the Eighth Amendment.3 2 The Court determined that using such evidence tainted the trial by
injecting an arbitrary factor into the sentencing process. 3 3 Furthermore, the

life." Id. at 499-500. The daughter said that the murders have made her withdrawn and
distrustful, and she also suffers from sleeplessness. Id. at 500. Her opinion of the defendant
was that he could not be forgiven, and people like him could "[niever be rehabilitated." Id.
The interviewing DPP official concluded the victim impact statement as follows:
It became increasingly apparent to the writer as she talked to the family members that the
murder of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein is still such a shocking, painful and devastating memory to them that it permeates every aspect of their daily lives. It is doubtful that they will
ever be able to fully recover from this tragedy and not be haunted by the memory of the
brutal manner in which their loved ones were murdered and taken from them.
Id.; see id. at 509-15 (full text of the victim impact statement); Hough v. State, 560 N.E.2d 511,
514-15 (Ind. 1990) (reciting information in Booth's victim impact statements and distinguishing Booth by comparing difference in detail of information in instant case's victim impact
statements); Charlton T. Howard, Note, Booth v. Maryland-Death Knell for the Victim Impact Statement?, 47 MD. L. REV. 701, 703 n. 11 (1988) (reciting text in victim impact statement
in Booth); Susan A. Jump, Note, Booth v. Maryland: Admissibility of Victim Impact Statements During Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder Trials, 21 GA. L. REV. 1191, 1192 n.6
(1987) (reciting pertinent portion of victim impact statements considered in Booth). See generally Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing
Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 202-11 (1988) (discussing various types of information which
may be included in victim impact statements).
31. Booth, 482 U.S. at 501. Booth received the death penalty for the murder of Mr.
Bronstein and life imprisonment for the murder of Mrs. Bronstein. Id. See generally Regina
A. Jones, Note, Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Eighth Amendment
Prohibits Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence at Sentencing Phase of Capital Trial, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1160-61 (1988) (reviewing facts of Booth).
32. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509; see also State v. Pennington, 575 A.2d 816, 827 (N.J. 1990)
(relying on Booth to hold formal victim impact statements inadmissible in capital trials); State
v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1062-63 (Ohio 1990) (citing Booth to support appellant's claim
that victim impact statements were inadmissible in sentencing phase of capital trial). See generally, Paul Boudreaux, Booth v. Maryland and the Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 177, 196 (1989) (discussing Booth holding in
relation to society's need for individual vengeance in sentencing criminal defendants). The
Booth Court also held that opinions of the family members and their characterizations of the
crime were inadmissible. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09 (victim opinions and characterizations
inflame jury and divert focus away from relevant evidence). However, since the admissibility
of family members' opinions was not an issue in Payne, the focus of this note is on Booth's
holding concerning the admissibility of evidence relating to the impact the crime had on the
victim. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S....
n.2, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 n.2, 115 L. Ed. 2d
720, 739 n.2 (1991). For a discussion of the admissibility of the victim's opinion at trial, see
Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing
Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 210 (1988) (admission of victim's opinion frustrates goals of
equality and proportionality in sentencing).
33. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505; see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, CRIMINAL
LAW § 3.5, at 216 (2nd ed. 1986) (criminal intent extends only to that which is intended or
substantially certain to occur); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (criminal
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Court cautioned that allowing the sentencing authority to consider victim
impact evidence may shift the focus away from the defendant to the victims'
worthiness in the community and their ability to express their grief.34 The
Court, however, did not completely rule out the use of victim impact evi-

dence where it directly relates to the circumstances of the incident.35 The
minority of the Court, however, believed that the sentencer should consider
harm to the victims because it substantially relates to the defendant's personal responsibility.3 6 Additionally, they reasoned that the law should allow

sentence must relate to offender's culpability); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 624-28 (1978)
(opinion of White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment) (arguing against death penalty inflicted on defendant lacking purpose to cause death); Rollin M.
Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 911 (1939) (one intends result if
acts for purpose of causing result or if realizes that result is substantially certain to occur).
34. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505-07; see State v. Pennington, 575 A.2d 816, 828 (N.J. 1990)
(defendant's culpability depends on offense's elements, not victim's character); State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1062-63 (Ohio 1990) (victim impact evidence could distract jury from
focusing on accused in determination of whether to impose death penalty [quoting Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 (1987)]); see also Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?,27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 395 (1989) (sentencing process needs
to focus on defendant and with victim evidence this emphasis improperly shifted to victim);
Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 991-92 (1985)
(injecting victim's testimony during defendant's blameworthiness determination calls into
question victim's relative blameworthiness and whether victim "deserved" what he got).
35. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10; see South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811-12
(1989) (analyzing whether victim's personal effects could be admitted into evidence as being a
circumstance of crime under Booth); see also Eric S. Newman, Note, Eighth AmendmentProsecutorialComment Regarding the Victim's PersonalQualities Should not be Permitted at
the Sentencing Phase of a CapitalTrial, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1236, 1254-55 (1990)
(discussing why evidence relating to circumstances of crime should be admitted during sentencing phase); Richard L. Slowinski, Note, South Carolina v. Gathers: Prohibitingthe Use of
Victim-Related Information in Capital Punishment Proceedings, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 215,
235-36 (1990) (discussion of Court's rationale in not allowing victim's personal effects to be
admitted as evidence).
36. Booth, 482 U.S. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White opined that many, if
not most, people would agree that a reckless driver deserves a more harsh penalty if he runs a
stoplight and unintentionally kills a pedestrian than one who merely runs a stoplight. Id. at
516. The blameworthiness of each offender, however, is the same since both lacked the specific
intent to kill. Id. Justice Scalia wrote that the majority's premise of basing a capital punishment decision solely on moral guilt is nowhere to be found in the text of the Constitution, the
Court's opinions, or history of societal practice. Id. at 519-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. -, - Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2606, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 732 (1991) (two
significances of harm are (1) as prerequisite to criminal sanction and (2) as standard for determining severity of sentence) (quoting S. WHEELER, ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 56 (1988)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (noting that it is desirable to provide
sentencing jury with as much information as possible); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
246 (1949) (demonstrating that sentencing judges allowed wide discretion in making punishment determination). See generally Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm:
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the State to offer victim impact evidence in order to balance the mitigating

evidence allowed for the defendant. 7
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear South
Carolina v. Gathers.38 In Gathers, the jury found the defendant guilty of

murder and first degree sexual conduct, and imposed the death penalty after
hearing victim-related information during the sentencing phase of trial.3 9
Relying on Booth, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the senBooth v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1303, 1333 (1988) (arguing that Booth majority's reliance on culpability rationale unjustified because victim harm should be considered).
37. Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated that the sentencer
should be reminded that the victim, as well as the murderer, should be considered as an individual whose death deprives society and the victim's family. Id. Justice Scalia buttressed this
view by stating that allowing the defendant's mitigating evidence while suppressing the victim's voice creates a debate "with one side muted." Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Compare
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) (indicating that capital defendant must be permitted to offer any relevant mitigating evidence) and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05
(1978) (concluding that Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require sentencer to consider
mitigating evidence concerning defendant's character, record, and circumstances of offense)
with South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810-11 (1989) (noting that prosecutor's comments concerning victim's personal characteristics not allowed during sentencing phase of capital trial) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987) (holding that victim impact
statements inadmissible at sentencing portion of capital trial). See Regina A. Jones, Note,
ConstitutionalLaw-Cruel and Unusual Punishment-EighthAmendment Prohibits Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence at Sentencing Phase of CapitalMurder Trial, 19 RUTGERS L.J.
1159, 1169 (1988) (arguing that there is a need to cure imbalance in criminal justice system);
Lester K. Syren, Note, Booth v. Maryland: Whether Victim Impact Statements Are Unconstitutional in Death Penalty Cases, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 171, 184-85
(1989) (arguing in favor of balancing mitigating evidence with evidence concerning victim).
38. 490 U.S. at 805, 810. Gathers was also a 5-4 decision. Id. at 805. Justice Brennan
authored the majority opinion in which Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined. Justice O'Connor filed a dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy
joined. Justice Scalia filed a separate dissent. Id. at 805. See generally Richard L. Slowinski,
South Carolina v. Gathers: Prohibitingthe Use of Victim-Related Information in Capital Punishment Proceedings, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 215, 217-18 (1990) (tracing Gathers through lower

courts).
39. Gathers,490 U.S. at 806-07. Richard Haynes, the murder victim, was an unemployed
3 1-year-old. Id. at 807. Haynes, who had experienced mental problems, referred to himself as
"Reverend Minister" even though he had not been formally trained in religion. Id.
Demetrius Gathers, along with three companions, severely beat and kicked Haynes and
broke a bottle over his head. Gathers then rammed an umbrella into Haynes' anus. Upon
returning to the scene some time later, Gathers stabbed the victim to death with a knife. Id.
The attackers then rummaged through Gathers' personal belongings in search of something to
steal. Id. at 807; see also Eric S. Newman, Note, Eighth Amendment-ProsecutorialComment
Regarding the Victim's Personal QualitiesShould Not Be Permitted at the Sentencing Phase of a
Capital Trial, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1236, 1236-37 (1990) (detailing factual background of Gathers); Richard L. Slowinski, Note, South Carolina v. Gathers: Prohibitingthe
Use of Victim-Related Information in Capital Punishment Proceedings, 40 CATH. U. L. REV.
215, 233-35 (1990) (reviewing facts of Gathers).
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tence of death and remanded the case for another sentence proceeding.'
Gathers differs from Booth in the type of victim-related information conveyed to the sentencing jury.41 In Booth, the jury heard evidence derived
from interviews with the victims' family,4 2 while the jury in Gathers heard
statements made by the prosecutor concerning the victim's religious beliefs,
vulnerability, mental problems, patriotism, and unemployment.43 The
40. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810; see Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 421 (1989) (personal characteristics as described in Gathers unrelated to defendant's culpability and therefore correctly inadmissible).
41. Compare Booth, 482 U.S. at 499 (victim impact statements based on interviews with
victim's family read to jury) with Gathers, 490 U.S. at 808 (victim impact evidence in form of
victim's personal characteristics given by prosecutor in closing argument). See Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 420
(1989) (discussion of the different forms in which victim impact information can be used);
Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing
Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 202-11 (1988) (differing forms of victim impact statements).
42. Booth, 482 U.S. at 499; see Hough v. State, 560 N.E.2d 511, 514-15 (Ind. 1990) (reciting information in Booth's victim impact statements and distinguishing Booth by comparing
difference in detail of information in instant case's victim impact statements); Charlton T.
Howard III, Note, Booth v. Maryland-Death Knell for the Victim Impact Statement?, 47
MD. L. REV. 701, 703 n. 11 (1988) (reciting text in victim impact statement in Booth); Susan A.
Jump, Note, Booth v. Maryland: Admissibility of Victim Impact Statements DuringSentencing
Phase of Capital Murder Trials, 21 GA. L. REV. 1191, 1192 n.6 (1987) (reciting pertinent
portion of victim impact statements considered in Booth). See generally Phillip A. Talbert,
The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the CriminalSentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 199, 202-11 (1988) (discussing various types of information which may be included in
victim impact statements).
43. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 808. The relevant sections of the prosecutor's closing argument
included a reading from a passage called "The Game Guy's Prayer" and comments made
about the voter registration card Haynes was carrying. The portion of the closing argument
which generated the controversy is as follows:
We know from the proof that Reverend Minister Haynes was a religious person. He had
his religious items out there. This defendant strewn [sic] them across the bike path, thinking nothing of that.
Among the many cards that Reverend Haynes had among his belongings was this card.
It's in evidence. Think about it when you go back there. He had this [sic] religious items,
his beads. He had a plastic angel. Of course, he is with the angels now, but this defendant
Demetrius Gathers could care little of the pain and agony he inflicted upon a person who
is trying to enjoy one of our public parks.
But look at Reverend Minister Haynes' prayer. It's called the Game Guy's Prayer.
"Dear God, help me to be a sport in this little game of life. I don't ask for any easy place
in this lineup. Play me anywhere you need me. I only ask you for the stuff to give you
one hundred percent of what I have got. If all the hard drives seem to come my way, I
thank you for the compliment. Help me to remember that you won't ever let anything
come my way that you and I together can't handle. And help me to take the bad break as
part of the game. Help me to understand that the game is full of knots and trouble, and
make me thankful for them. Help me to be brave so that the harder they come the better
I like it. And, oh God, help me to always play on the square. No matter what the other
players do, help me to come clean. Help me to study the book so that I'll know the rules,
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Court, however, did not see any relevance in the distinction and re-affirmed

its holding in Booth by concluding that victim impact statements, as well as
statements made by a prosecutor concerning the victim, violated the Eighth
Amendment."

The guidelines enunciated by the Court in Booth and Gathers created a
significant amount of confusion in the lower courts.4" Some courts made
to study and think a lot about the greatest player that ever lived and other players that are
portrayed in the book. If they ever found out the best part of the game was helping other
guys who are out of luck, help me to it find out, too. Help me to be regular, and also an
inspiration with the other players. Finally, oh God, if fate seems to uppercut me with
both hands, and I am laid on the shelf in sickness or old age or something, help me to take
that as part of the game, too. Help me not to whimper or squeal that the game was a
frameup or that I had a raw deal. When in the falling dusk I get the final bell, I ask for no
lying, comlimentary tombstones. I'd only like to know that you feel that I have been a
good guy, a good game guy, a saint in the game of life."
Reverend Minister Haynes, we know, was a very small person. He had his mental
problems. Unable to keep a regular job. And he wasn't blessed with fame or fortune.
And he took things as they came along. He was prepared to deal with tragedies that he
came across in his life....
You will find some other exhibits in this case that tell you more about a just verdict.
Again this is not easy. No one takes any pleasure from it, but the proof cries out from the
grave in this case. Among the personal effects that this defendant could care little about
when he went through it is something we all treasure. Speaks a lot about Reverend Minister Haynes. Very simple yet very profound. Voting. A voter's registration card. Reverend Haynes believed in this community. He took part. And he believed that in
Charleston County, in the United States of America, that in this country you could go to
a public park and sit on a public bench and not be attacked by the likes of Demetrius
Gathers.
Id. at 808-10. See Eric S. Newman, Note, Eighth Amendment-Prosecutorial Comment Regarding the Victim's PersonalQualities Should Not Be Permitted at the Sentencing Phase of a
CapitalTrial, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1236, 1238 (1990) (reprinting and discussion of
"Game Guy's Prayer").
44. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812. See Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2604, 115 L. Ed. 2d
at 730 (1991) (Gathers extended rule in Booth to prosecutorial statements concerning victim's
characteristics); State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1063 (Ohio 1990) (Gathers extends Booth
holding to personal characteristics mentioned by prosecutor); Richard L. Slowinski, Note,
South Carolina v. Gathers: Prohibitingthe Use of Victim-Related Information in Capital Punishment Proceedings,40 CATH. U. L. REV.215, 236 (1990) (evidence inadmissible in Gathers
since information sufficiently similar to type condemned in Booth). But see Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 421
(1989) (discussing uncertainty after Booth and Gathers as to what types of victim impact statements are excluded).
45. See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812-13 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting) (discussing confusion in
lower courts in applying Booth); State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1070 (Ohio 1990) (Moyer,
C.J., concurring) (urging Supreme Court to give lower courts more direction in applying Booth
and Gathers to victim impact evidence admissibility); see also Eric S. Newman, Note, Eighth
Amendmeht-ProsecutorialComment Regarding the Victim's Personal QualitiesShould Not Be
Permitted at the Sentencing Phase of a Capital Trial, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1236,
1242-45 (1990) (reviewing Justice O'Connor's dissent in Gathers and her recommendation that
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distinctions between cases tried before juries and judges, and others attempted to distinguish between the amount of information provided by victim impact evidence.4 6 This confusion, coupled with changes in the Court's
personnel, made the decisions ripe for reconsideration.4 7
In the 1991 case of Payne v. Tennessee,4 8 the United States Supreme Court
followed the dissenting opinions in Booth and Gathers and specifically rejected the trend created by those cases. 4 9 The Court ruled that the Eighth
Amendment does not create a per se bar to the use of victim impact statements during a capital trial's sentencing phase."0 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, stated that the harm caused by a defendant through
his crime has been an important consideration in criminal law.5 In order to
determine an offense's elements and its appropriate punishment, judges need
to consider this information.5 2 Furthermore, the Court noted that a judge

Booth be read narrowly); Richard L. Slowinski, Note, South Carolina v. Gathers: Prohibiting
the Use of Victim-Related Information in Capital Punishment Proceedings, 40 CATH. U. L.
REV. 215, 236 (1990) (discussing O'Connor's dissent in Gathers relating to confusion in lower
courts after Booth).
46. See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing confusion
Booth created for lower courts); Hough v. State, 560 N.E.2d 511, 515 (Ind. 1990) (defendant's
Eighth Amendment right not violated by introduction of letters written by victim's family
recommending death penalty); State v. Post, 513 N.E.2d 754, 759 (Ohio 1987) (introduction of
victim impact evidence not warranting death penalty reversal since case was tried before threejudge panel); see also Eric S. Newman, Note, Eighth Amendment-Prosecutorial Comment
Regarding the Victim's PersonalQualities Should Not Be Permittedat the Sentencing Phase of a
Capital Trial, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1236, 1242-45 (1990) (reviewing Justice
O'Connor's Gathers dissent regarding confusion caused by Booth); Richard L. Slowinski, Note,
South Carolina v. Gathers: Prohibitingthe Use of Victim-Related Information in CapitalPunishment Proceedings, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 215, 236 (1990) (discussing Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Gathers relating to confusion in lower courts after Booth).
47. See Payne, 501 U.S. at - ,11 S. Ct. at 2619, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 748 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that only change between Booth and Payne was Court's composition);
State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1070 (Ohio 1990) (Moyer, C.J., concurring) (requesting
guidance from Court in applying Booth and Gathers); David 0. Stewart, FourSpiritedDissenters, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 40 (discussing Court's desire to resolve victim-evidence issue after
Booth).
48. 501 U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991).
49. See Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2611, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 738-39 (Booth and
Gathers wrongly decided and are now overruled).
50. Id. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 736. The Court did not express an
opinion on the admissibility of characterizations and opinions of the victim's family. Id. at n.2, 111 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 739 n.2. Although the Booth Court held that this
type of evidence violated the Eighth Amendment, the issue did not arise in Payne. Id.
51. Id. at , 111 S. Ct. at 2605, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 731.
52. Id. at
11I, S. Ct. at 2605, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 731; see Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 519 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (although moral guilt of two bank robbers who aim their
guns at a guard and pull trigger may be identical, responsibility for one who kills is greater
than one whose gun misfires); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148-49 (1987) (if robbery with

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss2/8

14

Clements: The Scope of the Eighth Amendment Does Not Include a Per Se Bar t

1991]

CASENOTES

needs to consider, among other factors, the harm that the offense caused
when exercising discretion. 3 The Court also reasoned that the holding in
Booth created an imbalance in capital trials.54 While a capital defendant
may offer relevant mitigating evidence without restriction, the State may not
offer evidence on the harm to the victim and society caused by the defendant's actions." The Court determined that the sentencing authority may
fairly consider such harm while also considering the defendant's mitigating
evidence.5 6 Responding to the argument that the defendant's rebuttal of victim impact evidence would create a "'mini-trial' on the victim's character,"
the majority reasoned that because of its relevance during the guilt phase of
trial, much of the victim evidence has already been offered to the jury." As
for the additional evidence introduced during the sentencing phase, the
Court stated that the decision faced by the defendant on the prudence of
rebutting is no different than other cases encountering this dilemma.5" The
Court recognized that the fact-finder should determine the weight of relevant, unprivileged evidence with the help of cross-examination and the opposing party's contrary evidence. 59

Additionally, the defendant in Payne used the argument that this type of
evidence permitted the sentencing authority to determine the sentence based
on the perceived worth of the victim." The argument follows that victims
who are greater assets to the community prompt the sentencing authority to
find the defendant more deserving of punishment. 61 The majority answered

this concern by declaring that victim impact statements serve the purpose of
showing the victim's "uniqueness as an individual human being," regardless

reckless disregard for human life results in death of victim, death penalty may be imposed, but
death penalty not allowed if victim does not die).
53. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 11l S. Ct. at 2606, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 732.
54. See Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2607, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 733. The Court suggested that the
majority in Booth misread precedent providing that a defendant in a capital trial be treated as a
"uniquely individual human being." See id. at -I, 11 S. Ct. at 2606-07, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 733
(quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). The Payne majority reasoned
that the language from Woodson was not intended to be read as describing the evidence which
could not be admitted, but rather, which evidence must be admitted. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at
2607, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 733 (emphasis in original).
,111 S. Ct. at 2607, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 733.
55. Id. at
111
I, S. Ct. at 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 736.
56. Id. at
57. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2607, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 734.

58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983)).
60. Id. This argument was also used by the defendant in Booth, but with more success.
See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506 (1987) (no justification for death penalty decision
based on perception that victim was "sterling member of community" rather than person with
"questionable character").
61. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, Il1 S. Ct. at 2607, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 734.
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of the jury's perception of the community's loss. 6 2 The majority also responded to the argument that admitting victim impact evidence during a
capital trial's sentencing phase leads to an arbitrary application of the death
penalty.6 3 Answering this argument, the Court reasoned that the use of victim impact statements serve legitimate purposes, and the Due Process
Clause provides a method for relief for a trial rendered fundamentally
unfair.'
The Court justified overruling only three years of established precedent by
commenting on how Booth and Gathers created uncertainty in the law with
regard to victim impact evidence.65 The Court pointed to the narrow margins of those decisions and the inconsistent application by the lower courts
as valid reasons for reviewing their holdings.6 6
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter each wrote a separate concurrence
in Payne.67 Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, stated that because of the
potential relevance of victim impact evidence, the states should treat it in the
same manner as other types of relevant evidence. 68 Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor reasoned that the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual
practices and punishments according to beliefs held by society. 69 Applying
this interpretation of the Eighth Amendment to Payne, Justice O'Connor
further opined that no consensus of society believes that a victim should not
take part in a capital trial's penalty phase.7 ° Additionally, Justice O'Connor
pointed out that the holding of Payne does not require, or even suggest, the
admission of victim impact evidence.7 1 Payne merely permits a state, if it
chooses, to consider this evidence without violating the Eighth
Amendment.72

62. Id. The phrase "uniqueness as a human being" comes from Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). Supporting this rationale, the majority gave the facts of Gathers
as an example. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, Il1 S. Ct. at 2607, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 734. The victim in
that case was unemployed and had mental problems. Id.
63. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2608, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 735.
64. Id. (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-83 (1986)).
65. Id. at , I S. Ct. at 2609-11, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 736-39.
66. Id. at , 111 S. Ct. at 2611, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 738.
67. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2601, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 726.
68. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2611, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 739 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor's concurrence was joined by Justices White and Kennedy. Id.
69. Id. at -I, Il S. Ct. at 2611-12, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 739 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 821 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
70. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2612, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 739 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Supporting this view, Justice O'Connor points out that a majority of states have enacted
legislation allowing victim impact evidence to be considered. Id.

71. Id.
72. Id. at

-,

111 S. Ct. at 2612, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 739-40. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, 73 supported overruling Booth by stating
that the decision has no constitutional, historical, or logical foundation. 74
The majority in Payne, according to Justice Scalia, correctly disregarded the
doctrine of stare decisis because of the "plainly inadequate rational support"
which plagued both Booth and Gathers.7
In Justice Souter's concurrence, 76 he expressed the view that victim harm
deserves consideration since every defendant, if able to establish a criminal
responsibility, should know that the foreseeable consequences of murder include the inevitable harm that the decedent's survivors will suffer.77 Justice
Souter also complained about the unworkable standard that Booth created.78
In its full effect, reasoned Justice Souter, Booth requires either forbidding the
jury from hearing victim impact evidence at the guilt phase of trial or impanelling a new jury to determine the sentence. 79 The first situation deprives
the jury of facts it needs to understand the case, and the second alternative
creates a significant imposition on the states.8 0
In his dissent to Payne, Justice Marshall criticized the majority's disregard
for the doctrine of stare decisis.8s Justice Marshall reasoned that the Booth
and Gathers decisions should prevail because their rationale remains persuasive. 2 Furthermore, according to Marshall, the majority did not give the
extraordinary showing historically insisted on by the Court before overruling precedent.8 3 Additionally, Justice Marshall noted the decisions leading
up to Payne which recognized the need for an "individualized determination" of the defendant's blameworthiness.8 4 This determination furthers the
established goal of minimizing the risk of arbitrariness in imposing the death
penalty.85 According to Justice Marshall, the Payne decision frustrates this

73. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2613, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 740-41 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia's concurrence was joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy as to Part II only. Id.
74. Payne, 501 U.S. at-, 111 S. Ct. at 2613, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 741 (Scalia, J., concurring).
75. Id. at -., II1 S. Ct. at 2613, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 741-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2614, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 742 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice
Souter's concurrence was joined by Justice Kennedy. Id.
77. Id. at -I, 11 S. Ct. at 2615, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 744 (Souter, J., concurring).
78. Payne, 501 U.S. at __, 111 S. Ct. at 2616, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 745 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
79.Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2617, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 746 (Souter, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. Id. at-, 111 S. Ct. at 2619, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall's dissent was joined by Justice Blackmun.
82. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2620, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 749 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2621, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 750-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 111 S. Ct. at 2619, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
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goal in allowing the introduction of victim impact evidence.8 6
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, stated that the Payne ruling allows the admission of evidence which does not reflect the character of the offense or
offender and therefore lacks relevancy. 7 This, reasoned Justice Stevens, encourages sentencing decisions based on emotion rather than reason. 8 Justice Stevens also attacked the majority's logic relating to the imbalance
created when allowing consideration of the defendant's mitigating evidence
while suppressing victim impact evidence. 9 That reasoning, according to
Justice Stevens, inaccurately depicts sentencing procedures since a state may
rebut any mitigating evidence profferred by the defendant.9" Additionally,
the Constitution affords criminal defendants certain protections in order to
guard against overreaching by the state's disproportionate power.9 1 Justice
Stevens further challenged the majority's holding by pointing out that the
use of victim impact evidence defies consistent application since its scope is
not determined until after the commission of the crime.92 This inconsistent
application leads to a broadening of the sentencer's discretion, and therefore
fails to further the goal of minimizing arbitrariness in death penalty
decisions.9 3

As a result of Payne, the realm of information admissible during the sentencing phase of a capital trial now includes victim impact evidence.94
Although advocates of victim's rights may see this decision as a victory,9"
86. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2619-2620, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 749 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id. at -I_,11 S. Ct. at 2625-26, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 756 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Steven's dissent was joined by Justice Blackmun. Id.
88. Id. at - 111 S. Ct. at 2625, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 756 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2627, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 758 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Id. An example given by Justice Stevens is the requirement that the state show beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty. Id.
92. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2628, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2629, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 761 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
94. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S .....
111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720,
736 (1991) (Eighth Amendment does not prohibit state from permitting victim impact evidence at capital trial's sentencing phase); People v. Mickle, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511, 545-46 (1991)
(Mosk, J., concurring) (Booth and Gathers overruled by Payne to extent that victim characteristics and victim impact inadmissible). But see Robison v. Maynard, No. 89-6166, 1991 WL
164737, at *1-*2 (10th Cir. August 29, 1991) (Payne holding not intended to include victim's
opinion that death penalty should not be invoked); see also David 0. Stewart, FourSpirited
Dissenters, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 40. (Payne offers new rule in allowing for admissibility of
victim impact evidence relating to victim and impact of death on family).
95. See Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2631, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 763 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (Payne decision will be welcomed among victim rights advocates); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (victims' rights proponents have found
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the reasoning of the Court and the implications on the criminal justice system indicate that the case was erroneously decided.9 6 Specifically, the decision goes against the capital sentencing goals of proportionality and nonarbitrariness. 97
Traditionally, the consequences intended by a defendant through his actions extend only to those which he desires or which he is substantially certain will result. 98 The consideration of victim impact statements contradict
criminal trials unjust in disregarding victim); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (victim's
interests should be taken into account in administration of criminal justice). See generally
Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a CriminalAction: An Overview of Issues
and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117 (1984) (expanding victim's role in criminal proceedings is
justifiable in spite of problems and complicated issues); Paul S. Hudson, The Crime Victim and
the CriminalJustice System: Time for A Change, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 23 (1984) (favoring increased victim involvement in criminal justice system).
96. See People v. Mickle, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 546 (Mosk, J., concurring) (victim impact
evidence irrelevant in consideration of defendant's personal moral culpability); see also Payne,
501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2625, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 756 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (majority's
opinion encourages jurors to impose death penalty based on emotion rather than reason);
Booth, 482 U.S. at 504 (victim impact factors may be completely unrelated to defendant's
blameworthiness); Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal, 27
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 395 (1989) (concern in justice system for accused can be undermined
when victim is considered); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 937, 948 (1985) ("discovery" of crime victim substitutes individual for state opposite
accused making trial seem more equal).
97. See Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2628, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 759 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (victim impact evidence contrary to Eighth Amendment's proscription that death
penalty not be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825
(1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (nexus between punishment and defendant's blameworthiness required to satisfy Eighth Amendment's requirement of proportionality); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (sentencer's
discretion should be limited so as to minimize risk of arbitrary and capricious action); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (punishment must not be inflicted arbitrarily by the state). The proportionality approach to capital punishment involves
consideration of several factors including the nature and seriousness of the crime, punishments
imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense and for more serious offenses, sentences
other criminals have received in the same jurisdiction, goals desired in punishing, and the
standards of decency which have developed. Id.; see also Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability,Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the Factors on Which Our CriminalLaw is Predicated, 66
N.C. L. REV. 283, 311 (1988) (proportion is key to a constitutional application of capital
punishment); Dora Nevares-Muniz, The Eighth Amendment Revisited: A Model of Weighted
Punishments, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 272, 274-75 (1984) (goals of proportionality and
non-arbitrariness have been defined as legitimate goals of capital punishment). See generally,
Anthony F. Granucci, 'Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:' The OriginalMeaning,
57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 842-44 (1969) (Supreme Court recognized that Eighth Amendment
prohibited disproportionate punishments at end of 19th century).
98. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5, at 216 (2nd ed.
1986); see Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 11 S. Ct. at 2628, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (victim impact evidence calls into question aspects of crime unforeseen by defendant);
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (criminal sentence must relate to offender's culpa-
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this premise by introducing evidence of which, in many cases, the defendant
has no knowledge when committing the crime.99 The Supreme Court, since
holding that the death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment,'oo
has consistently taken measures which seek to minimize the arbitrariness of
a death penalty decision.'o1 However, in Payne the Court seems to disregard

bility); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 624-28 (1978) (opinion of White, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment) (arguing against death penalty inflicted on
defendant who lacked purpose to cause death); see also Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationaleof Mens
Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 911 (1939) (one intends a result if he acts for purpose of causing
that result or if he realizes that the result is substantially certain to occur).
99. Compare Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 11l S. Ct. at 2629, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 761 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (victim impact evidence irrelevant since it details harm defendant is unable to foresee) with id. at -., 111 S. Ct. at 2615, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 744 (Souter, J., concurring) (harm to
victim's survivors is foreseeable result of murder); see also South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S.
805, 811 (1989) (imposing death penalty after allowing jury to rely on evidence of victim's
personal characterisitics could be based on factors which defendant was unaware); Booth, 482
U.S. at 504 (criminal defendant often knows nothing about victim and rarely selects victim on
basis of effect crime will have on victim's family); People v. Levitt, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276, 287-88
(Cal.App. 1984) (culpability depends on factors over which defendant has control); Dina R.
Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391,
423-24 (1989) (proposing that to fulfill requirement of foreseeability defendant must satisfy a
separate mens rea with respect to the effect on the victim). See generally Richard S. Murphy,
The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the
Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1303, 1304-05 (1988) (focus on defendant's culpability and
foreseeable events cannot be reconciled with consideration of victim harm).
100. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (imposition of death penalty is not cruel and unusual and therefore does not violate
Eighth Amendment); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.) (rejecting argument that death penalty violates Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments as cruel and unusual punishment); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (statutory scheme under which death was imposed was not violative
of Eighth Amendment). See generally RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME
COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 5-9 (1982) (Supreme Court "strayed from the abolitionist path"
in Gregg and thereby revised the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in favor of a supervision of capital punishment); Robert A. Burt, Disorderin the Court: The Death Penalty and the
Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1741 (1987) (beginning in 1976 Supreme Court began to
ease doubts on constitutionality of death penalty by rationalizing and routinizing its
application).
101. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976) (total arbitrariness and capriciousness is eliminated when sentencer is required to review factors favoring or against death penalty); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (sentencer's discretion in imposing death penalty must be limited
to negate risk of arbitrariness); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 790 (Colo. 1990) (sentencer's discretion must be limited to minimize risk of arbitrary and capricious action); see also
Lisa G. Bradley, Proportionalityin Capital and Non-Capital Sentencing.- An Eighth Amendment Enigma, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 195, 195 (1986-87) (Eighth Amendment mandates regularity
and reliability in imposing death penalty); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion?
Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1942-44 (1988)
(during early 1970's Congress began to take exception to wide discretion allowed for federal
sentencing judges and began considering proposals for sentencing reform).
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that concern in favor of a concensus of society which supports the rights of
victims.' 02 Although societal values do factor into Eighth Amendment analysis when determining cruel and unusual punishments, the Court should not
bind itself to this concern at the expense of other overriding concerns such as
reliability in sentencing.1 ° 3 The use of victim impact evidence improperly
diverts the sentencer's attention away from the defendant's moral blameworthiness to the victim's character and reputation." ° This results in an impermissible risk of imposing the death penalty on the basis of "caprice or
emotion" and therefore in an arbitrary manner."0 5

102. See Payne, 501 U.S. at -., 111 S. Ct. at 2612, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 739 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (no societal concensus that jury may not consider victim harm); Gathers,490 U.S.
at 821 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that prosecutor's remarks about victim do not offend
society's moral consensus); Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (popular victim rights
movement should be taken into account in deciding whether to admit victim impact evidence);
see also Symposium, The Victim's Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 11 PEPP. L.
REV. 1, 12 (1984) (movement is in progress nationally to elevate crime victims to "rightful
places"); Maureen McLeod, Victim Participationat Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 502
(1986) (legislation in area of victim rights result of increased demands being voiced by victims
rights advocates).
103. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987) (discussing requirement of
societal consensus that death penalty be proportionate to offense before it may be imposed);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (identifying public attitude as a relevant concern in Eighth Amendment
application); Steven Kasten, EvolutionaryJurisprudence: Prospectsand Limitations on the Use
of Modern Darwinism Throughout the Legal Process.By John H Beckstrom, 88 MICH. L. REV.
1858, 1858 (1990) (pointing out that popular consensus, although suspect as a principled lawmaking guide, remains durable).
104. See Payne, 501 U.S. -, Ill S. Ct. at 2629-30, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 761 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (use of victim impact evidence risks shifting focus away from defendant); Booth,
482 U.S. at 505 (victim impact evidence could divert jury's focus away from defendant and
circumstances of crime and create 'mini-trial' on character of victim); State v. Pennington, 575
A.2d 816, 828 (N.J. 1990) (defendant's culpability depends on the offense's elements, not on
victim's character); State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1063 (Ohio 1990) (victim impact evidence could distract jury from focusing on accused in determination of whether to impose
death penalty [quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 (1987)]); see also Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 395
(1989) (sentencing process needs to focus on defendant and with victim evidence this emphasis
is improperly shifted to victim); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37
STAN. L. REV. 937, 991-92 (1985) (injecting victim's testimony during defendant's blameworthiness determination calls into question the victim's relative blameworthiness and whether
victim "deserved" what he got).
105. See Payne, 501 U.S. -, I.l S. Ct. at 2630-31, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 762 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (proscription against arbitrary application of death penalty must forbid use of victim impact evidence due to its irrelevance to defendant's culpability); Pennington, 575 A.2d at
827 (admission of victim impact statements risks a death penalty decision made arbitrarily
[quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987)]); see also Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-03 (use
of victim impact evidence creates risk that jury will apply death sentence in arbitrary fashion);
Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness,and Harm: Balancing the Factors on Which
Our Criminal Law is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REV. 283, 314 (1988) (reluctance of Court in
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The decision in Payne will likely weigh heavily against criminal defendants.' °6 Although the majority saw a need to allow the State to balance the
defendant's mitigating evidence with evidence of victim impact, this view

goes against the demands of the Constitution.

°7

In order to ensure that the

"disproportionately powerful State" does not disadvantage the criminal de-

fendant, the accused must have certain protective rights."18
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in Payne, correctly assessed the confusion of the lower courts in applying Booth to capital sentencing deci-

sions.

°

The problems centered around whether to employ a broad or

Booth to let victim's character influence jury's decision is understandable in light of its irrelevancy in culpability determination); Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm:
Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1303, 1316 (1988) (use of victim impact statements is arbitrary since degree of victim
suffering does not assist in determining defendant's culpability).
106. See Payne, 501 U.S. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 2625, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 756 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (Payne decision compromises Court's role as protector of powerless); Horton v.
Zant, 1991 No. 90-8522, 1991 WL 169211, at *13 (Ga. Sept. 3, 1991) (using Payne to reject
defendant's claim of arbitrariness); United States v. Berzon, No. 90-2080, 1991 WL 144494, at
*12 (Me. Aug. 5, 1991) (using Payne to justify a wide and unlimited discretion for judge in
considering information for sentencing); see also Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 430 (1989) (victim impact evidence
weighs against defendant by infringing constitutional rights).
107. Compare Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 1I S. Ct. at 2627, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 758 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criminal defendant is protected by certain rights in Constitution and state is limited from overreaching) with id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2608, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 735 (not allowing
victim impact statements is potentially unfair when defendant is allowed to offer mitigating
evidence); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that sentencer not be prevented from hearing defendant's mitigating evidence);
FED. RULE EVID. 404(a). The prosecution is not permitted to introduce evidence of the defendant's character to show criminal propensities, but the defendant is able to introduce such
evidence to show his good character. Id.
108. See Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2627, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 758 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (balance between state and defendant not required); In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
368 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a constitutional requirement imposed on States); see also Charles Maechling, Truth In Prosecuting,A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 59
(protection of defendant's rights justifies the wide range of procedural and constitutional safeguards); Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning
of ConstitutionalEquality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1769 (1989) (because of unequal distribution of power between accused and state, criminal defendants are given advantage of every
reasonable doubt).
109. See State v. Post, 513 N.E.2d 754, 759 (Ohio 1987). In Post the introduction of
victim impact evidence did not warrant death penalty reversal since the case was tried before a
three-judge panel as opposed to a jury and there was no evidence that the panel "was influenced by or considered the victim impact evidence" in the sentencing process. Id.; see also
Hough v. State, 560 N.E.2d 511, 515 (Ind. 1990) (defendant's Eighth Amendment right not
violated by introduction of letters written by victim's family recommending death penalty);
Huertas, 553 N.E.2d at 1070 (Moyer, C.J., concurring) (urging Supreme Court to give courts
more direction in applying Booth and Gathers to victim impact evidence admissibility); Eric S.
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narrow reading of Booth. "o Although Payne should cure this problem, the
courts will experience other problems in allowing victim impact evidence
during a capital trial's sentencing phase."' Perhaps a more practical approach to the problems associated with Booth would include a clarification
of its implications." 2

Newman, Note, Eighth Amendment-ProsecutorialComment Regarding the Victim's Personal
QualitiesShould Not Be Permitted at the Sentencing Phase of a Capital Trial, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1236, 1242-45 (1990) (reviewing Justice O'Connor's dissent in Gathers and her
recommendation that Booth be read narrowly); Richard L. Slowinski, Note, South Carolina v.
Gathers: Prohibitingthe Use of Victim-Related Information in CapitalPunishmentProceedings,
40 CATH. U.L. REV. 215, 236-39 (1990) (discussion of Justice O'Connor's dissent in Gathers
relating to confusion in lower courts after Booth).
110. Compare South Carolina v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988) (applying
broad reading of Booth to forbid inclusion of victim's personal characteristics in sentencing
phase) with Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775, 782 (Ind. 1988) (interpreting Booth narrowly to
allow prosecutor's comments on victim's personal characteristics which had been adduced as
evidence during trial); see also People v. Rich, 755 P.2d 960, 993-94 (Cal. 1988) (Booth read
narrowly to allow prosecutor's comments at penalty phrase concerning victim's family); Dina
R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391,
421-22 (1989) (Booth's effect on victim impact statements was not clear since some courts read
it narrowly by allowing victim impact evidence when case was tried before judge instead of
jury); Eric S. Newman, Note, Eighth Amendment-ProsecutorialComment Regarding the Victim's PersonalQualities Should Not Be Permitted at the Sentencing Phaseof a Capital Trial, 80
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1236, 1242-46 (1990) (Justice O'Connor noted in Gathers' dissent the differing interpretations by lower courts on whether to use broad or narrow application of Booth); Richard L. Slowinski, Note, South Carolina v. Gathers: Prohibitingthe Use of
Victim-Related Information in Capital Punishment Proceedings, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 215,
236-39 (1990) (discussion of Justice O'Connor's implied support of a narrow reading of Booth).
11. Compare Payne, 501 U.S. at -., III S. Ct. at 2610-11, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 737-38
(justifying overruling Booth and Gathers by indicating that it would solve problem of their
inconsistent application by lower courts) with id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2622, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 752
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (opining that evidence majority gives for inconsistent application in
lower courts is insufficient). See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 813 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (offering
confusion in lower courts as reason for overruling Booth); Huertas, 553 N.E.2d at 1070
(Moyer, C.J., concurring) (asking that United States Supreme Court provide opinion with
more guidance on use of victim impact statements); see also Victim Rights Laws Sometimes
Bring Frustration,Survey Finds, 18 CRIM. JUST. NEWSL. (Pace Publications), Dec. 15, 1987, at
3-4 (ABA survey reveals that judges have encountered scheduling difficulties, delays, and an
increase in legal challenges by defendants who accuse judges of being overly sympathetic to
victims as a result of victim rights laws); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights,
37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 965-66 (1985) (criminal justice system's focus is on event itself and is
not able to cater to needs of victim).
112. See Payne, 501 U.S. at -., III S. Ct. at 2622, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 752 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that confusion in lower courts was insufficient to overrule precedent);
Huertas, 553 N.E.2d at 1070 (Moyer, C.J., concurring) (asking Supreme Court for guidance in
applying Booth and Gathers); Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or
Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 421 (Booth created uncertainty as far as what type of
victim impact evidence is prohibited); Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Impact
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Overruling precedent necessarily creates an uncertain legal system." 3
The relaxation of established law calls into question the strength of other
precedents.'4 In a "society governed by the rule of law," the drastic measure of overruling precedent should occur only in situations which present a
strong justification.' "'
The majority's opinion in Payne marks a significant step backward in the
pursuit of a capital sentencing scheme free of arbitrariness. The scope of
significant factors in death penalty decisions will now include the victim's
ability to express grief persuasively enough to earn the sentencer's sympathy.
Prosecutors will take advantage of this new weapon by tailoring their arguments to jurors who are most susceptable to an emotional display by the
victims. Sentencers will therefore be exposed to evidence which does not
reflect the criminal defendant's culpability and have the ability to consider
that evidence in deciding his ultimate fate.
Jimmie 0. Clements, Jr.

Statements to the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 228-30 (1988) (discussing the issue Booth left unresolved with regard to victim impact statements).
113. See Payne, 501 U.S. at -_,Ill S. Ct. at 2623, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 753 (message sent by
overruling precedent is that all decisions are ripe for reevaluation); Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)
(arbitrary and unpredictable results follow when law is open to revision on case-by-case basis);
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (Supreme Court precedent must be followed by lower
courts in order for federal judicial system to have structure); see also David 0. Stewart,, Four
Spirited Dissenters, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 40 (neglect to follow precedent disrupts expectations and makes the judicial system uncertain); Note, ConstitutionalStare Decisis, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1344, 1351 (1990) (public confidence in judicial system is undermined when Court
neglects to follow precedent).
114. Compare Payne, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2625, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 756 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (disregard for precedent in Payne encourages assault on other precedents) with
id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 737 (Court is not bound to precedent if decisions
are unworkable or based on faulty rationale); see also David 0. Stewart, FourSpiritedDissenters, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 40 (case reversal makes other precedent's vitality questionable).
115. See Payne, 501 U.S. at -, Il1 S. Ct. at 2621, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 751 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (Court has never deviated from precedent without "special justification" [quoting
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)]). Compare Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983) (adherence to stare decisis fundamental to "society
governed by law") with Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (following precedent is not "inexorable command"). See generally David 0. Stewart, Four Spirited
Dissenters, A.B.A. J., Sept 1991, at 40-41 (reviewing arguments put forth by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Marshall for and against following doctrine of stare decisis in Payne);
Note, ConstitutionalStare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1344, 1350 (1990) (giving strong justification helps calm fears that decisions are being made based on personal preferences).
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